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Abstract
We consider membership inference attacks, one of the
main privacy issues in machine learning. These recently
developed attacks have been proven successful in determin-
ing, with confidence better than a random guess, whether a
given sample belongs to the dataset on which the attacked
machine learning model was trained. Several approaches
have been developed to mitigate this privacy leakage but the
tradeoff performance implications of these defensive mech-
anisms (i.e., accuracy and utility of the defended machine
learning model) are not well studied yet. We propose a
novel approach of privacy leakage avoidance with switch-
ing ensembles (PASE), which both protects against current
membership inference attacks and does that with very small
accuracy penalty, while requiring acceptable increase in
training and inference time. We test our PASE method,
along with the the current state-of-the-art PATE approach,
on three calibration image datasets and analyze their trade-
offs.
1. Introduction
The spectacular successes of machine learning in re-
cent years have also brought significant scrutiny in its high-
profile security vulnerabilities. Although the focus has been
mostly on adversarial attacks, which were successfully con-
structed for a variety of applications [3, 4, 18, 21, 22, 16,
23, 13, 25], another group of security issues was recently
identified in machine learning concerning various forms of
privacy attacks. It was shown that it is possible to extract in-
formation about the training data by analyzing or querying
a machine learning model [1, 8, 7, 29, 2, 28].
In this paper, we focus on a type of attack commonly
referred to as membership inference attack. A success-
ful membership inference attack can determine, with bet-
ter than random success rate, if a given sample belongs to
the training set when given access to a machine learning
model [27]. This type of attack was introduced in [27], and
later [17] proposed a method of providing privacy guaran-
tees while taking into account the accuracy of the defended
classifier. The attack [27] leverages the differences in the
target model’s predictions (confidence values) on the sam-
ples it was trained on versus the samples which were out-
side of training data for detecting if a sample was part of
the training data. Even with such limited information, this
attack can be effective and remains effective for a variety of
privacy defense methods [27].
There have been many recent research advances in the
area of membership inference attacks. While [27] makes
several assumptions that weaken the scope of membership
attacks such as knowledge of the type of model and knowl-
edge of certain aspects of the training data, [24] is able
to generate successful attacks with weaker assumptions.
In [26], membership attacks exploit interpretable machine
learning output to get extra information about the training
data. Even unsupervised learning is susceptible as [9] has
described successful membership attacks in case of genera-
tive adversarial networks. Perhaps the most interesting re-
search has been applying differential privacy [6] as a way to
guarantee a defense against membership attacks. The PATE
algorithm [5, 20] uses a teacher-student framework to pro-
tect any machine learning algorithm from a broad range of
privacy attacks, including membership attacks, with differ-
ential privacy guarantees.
However, a security solution (in this context, privacy
protection) often entails some performance penalty (deteri-
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oration of accuracy and / or utility of the defended system).
For instance, for the case of preventing privacy leakage of
machine learning models, an obvious approach is to restrict
the classifier’s output to discrete labels without disclosing
the associated confidence values. However, this approach
significantly reduces the utility of machine learning model
since the choice of the subsequent actions frequently de-
pends on the level of confidence of the provided classifi-
cation decision. A less obvious approach is to restrict the
class of machine learning models to simple classifiers such
as linear threshold functions as their output does not have
local optima that can betray the identity of training data.
However, the applicability of such classifiers to realistic,
complex problems is severely limited. Finally, approaches
involving strong differential privacy guarantees can nega-
tively affect the utility / performance of the protected model.
In the case of PATE [6], the algorithm depends on an en-
semble of teachers where each teacher is based on a small
subset of the original training data. This not only negatively
affect the resulting accuracy, but also does that in the cir-
cumstances where the problem of privacy leakage is most
serious. Specifically, our experiments suggest that the effi-
ciency of privacy attacks increases with the decrease of the
size of training dataset since that makes training data more
“sparse” in the feature space, which exposes more data “in-
dividuality” that can then be then detected more easily by
the attacker.
In this paper, we propose and investigate a novel frame-
work of protecting machine learning models against mem-
bership attacks. Our framework is based on ensemble learn-
ing with the focus on maintaining utility and accuracy of the
existing machine learning model that is being protected. For
this framework, we modify the generally solid approach of
constructing an ensemble of classifiers by replacing its fi-
nal step of combining all their outputs (using, for instance,
some weighted voting) with a switching decision that se-
lects only one of the classifiers in the ensemble for provid-
ing the classification output for a given input. This modifi-
cation allows us to train the classifiers of the ensemble on
significantly larger subsets of the original dataset, thus in-
curring negligible performance penalty while maintaining
the desired privacy protection of the training data identity.
We describe the architecture of our proposed Privacy Leak-
age Avoidance with Switching Ensembles (PASE) method,
discuss its properties and implementation details, and cali-
brate its performance (along with the state-of-the-art PATE
approach [20]) on three popular image datasets (CIFAR-
10 [12], MNIST [14], SVNH [19]) within the framework of
the state-of-the-art membership inference attack proposed
in [27].
Figure 1. PASE architecture.
2. Privacy Leakage Avoidance Method
The training phase of PASE consists of building a set
(ensemble) of individual auxiliary classifiers, each trained
on a large subset of the original training data, where these
subsets are constructed in the same way as subsets for cross-
validation; the accuracy of each classifier would thus be
close to that of the baseline machine learning model that
uses all the available data for its training. The inference
phase of PASE is executed when a request for classification
is received – in this case, we select the element of our con-
structed ensemble of classifiers that was not trained on this
input or the element of the training data that is closest to
that input and use it for classification of the provided input
(hence the term “switching ensemble”).
More formally, Figure 1 shows that we generate k differ-
ent auxiliary classifiers (for illustration purposes, k = 4 in
Figure 1), where each classifier is built using an auxiliary
subset of the original training data G (shown as blue circle
in Figure 1), where these subsets (shown as three-quarters
of G in Figure 1) are created in the same way as in cross-
validation procedure with k = 4 folds. Specifically, we
randomly partition the set of training instances (elements of
training data G) into k approximately equally-sized groups
g1, g2, . . . , gk. We then train k classifiers M1,M2, . . . ,Mk,
where each Mj is trained on all these groups except group
gj , i.e., on G\gj . Our motivation here is to create a set of
these multiple classifiers so that, at inference phase, we can
select one of these classifiers that was not trained on the
given test instance x (shown as a green dot in Figure 1). In
order to ensure that, before making the actual inference, we
first select the element y of the training data that is closest
to test instance x (for that, we use Facebook AI Similarity
Search (FAISS) open source software [10]), and then select
the classifier that was trained on a dataset that did not in-
clude y; in Figure 1, that is the classifier M2.
In order to illustrate PASE operation geometrically, con-
sider Figure 2. The upper third of Figure 2 shows the train-
ing dataset consisting of 15 data points labeled as positive
and negative, so the machine learning task is to construct a
binary classifier. Using k = 3 in our PASE approach, the
training dataset is partitioned into three disjoint auxiliary
subsets shown in Figure 2 using black, blue and red colors.
The middle third of Figure 2 shows k = 3 auxiliary training
subsets, each of which containing all the original training
data without one of the above subsets. Specifically, the left-
most training dataset does not include black subset, the mid-
dle training dataset does not include blue dataset, and the
rightmost training dataset does not include red dataset. The
auxiliary classifiers (black, blue, and red), trained on each of
the three auxiliary training datasets, form PASE switching
ensemble, which effectively partitions the space into mul-
tiple areas (similar to Voronoi diagram) shown in the bot-
tom part of Figure 2. The switching mechanism of PASE
then selects the appropriate classifier for any given query
point: for instance, if the query point belongs to the area
with black boundaries, the black classifier will be applied;
if the query point belongs to the area with blue boundaries,
the blue classifier will be applied, etc.
As follows from the description above, if PASE is
queried with a data point y from training data, a classifier
that was not trained on y will be selected to respond to the
query. Moreover, as Figure 2 illustrates, this classifier will
be selected even the queried data point is not y itself but
rather a point that is “close” to y (i.e., located in the same
area with y). That property is especially important for im-
age applications since visual similarity to one of the ele-
ments of training data might be actually quite sufficient for
the purpose of membership inference attack.
Due to the way PASE selects its classifiers for making an
inference, it might seem that a membership inference attack
against PASE would always label the data as being not in
the training set, thus making the true negative value of that
binary attack classifier (the membership attack system is es-
sentially a binary classifier that decides, based on the query
response from the attacked system, whether the given query
was a part of training data or not) equal to 100%. That is
actually incorrect, and the confusion matrix of a member-
ship attack on a PASE-protected machine learning system
exhibits a more nuanced and interesting behavior. Concep-
tually, the balance between false positives and false nega-
tives of a membership attack on PASE mostly depends on
the sparsity of the training data in the corresponding feature
space.
Specifically, if data points are relatively “close” to each
other (or, to put it differently, the images do not ex-
hibit much individuality), the membership inference attack
would tend to label any point as belonging to the training
set (which does not cause privacy leakage since the train-
ing data points are poorly distinguishable anyway). Con-
versely, if data points are relatively “far” from each other
(or, to put it differently, the images do exhibit significant in-
dividuality), the membership inference attack would tend to
Figure 2. PASE geometry.
label any point as not belonging to the training set (which
again does not cause privacy leakage for the training data
points). These effects match the observations made in [27]
regarding the overall efficiency of membership inference at-
tacks: for instance, in CIFAR10 dataset [12], the privacy
leakage for the class of cars is smaller than that of the class
of cats, while privacy leakage in MNIST dataset [14] is
even smaller (images of cats apparently have more “indi-
viduality” that those of cars, and MNIST images of heavily
preprocessed handwritten digits have even less “individu-
ality”). Nevertheless, for the purpose of protection against
privacy leakage, this traditional tradeoff between false pos-
itives and false negatives eventually yields the accuracy of
the membership inference attack (against PASE-protected
system) being practically equal to 50% (i.e., the toss-up de-
cision for the attacker), as illustrated in the next Section on
several representative experiments.
In terms of practical implementation of the described
PASE approach, the same type / architecture of machine
learning model that has been already optimized for a given
dataset can be used for training for each of the ensemble
classifiers – there is no need to change that architecture with
the reasonable risk of adversely affecting the overall perfor-
mance. Depending on the number k of algorithms in the
switching ensemble, the accuracy penalty of our PASE so-
lution can be made negligibly small (of course, the train-
ing time will have to be proportionally increased), at least
within the context of membership inference attack of the
type [27].
Since PASE inference process includes the selection of
the appropriate algorithm from the constructed switching
ensemble, the inference would take more time than the stan-
dard machine learning model. However, in the experiments
we have carried out so far (described in the next Section),
we have not observed any practically meaningful delay in
terms of PASE inference time.
To summarize, the proposed PASE approach
• prevents privacy leakage in the context of membership
inference attacks of the type [27],
• does not cause any meaningful deterioration of accu-
racy / utility of the protected machine learning model,
• does not require any architecture changes of the ma-
chine learning model preferred for the given data
at the expense of practically acceptable
• increased training time,
• increased inference time,
• increased storage requirements for maintaining
switching ensemble models and training data index.
The next Section illustrates these tradeoff properties and
provides calibration results for a diverse set of image clas-
sification tasks.
Finally, note that PASE is designed for the type of
current state-of-the-art membership inference attack intro-
duced in [27]. The efficiency of such practical attacks has
been demonstrated on a variety of diverse datasets, and their
key enabler (confidence overfitting on some elements of the
training data) for such privacy leakage is already well un-
derstood. Given PASE protection against such attacks, it is
theoretically possible that an adversary might explore its ar-
chitecture for launching the following “next level” attack:
by using significant amount of probing the outputs of the
machine learning model by feeding it various data points
in the feature space, the attacker can reverse engineer the
boundaries of the areas where PASE decision is switched
from one classifier to another (illustrated in the bottom third
of Figure 2) and then infer the identity of the data point(s)
contained in these areas by some processing of these bound-
aries.
However, the practicality of such an attack is yet unclear:
besides seemingly enormous amount of probing it would
take to discover any meaningful portion of boundaries (that
amount can be probably significantly reduced if the probing
is carried out within a reasonably low-dimensional manifold
containing the training data – for instance, as it has been
done in the recently proposed model inversion attack [2],
although current model inversion attacks produce just gen-
eralized class representations, which is very different from
finer-granularity identities of training data points), the way
of identifying the training data point from the discovered
boundaries is unknown. The investigation of practicality
and efficiency of such kinds of model inference attacks is
thus a subject of future work. However, in the event that
these attacks turn out to be implementable and efficient,
the current PASE architecture can be then easily modi-
fied, for instance, by using the “moving target” approach,
where k auxiliary subsets are periodically changed (and the
corresponding k classifiers in the PASE ensemble are re-
trained), thus completely invalidating the results of the pre-
vious probes by the attacker. The exact details of such mod-
ifications are also a subject of future work, to be carried out
depending on the feasibility of the “next level” attack de-
scribed above.
3. Experiments and Discussion
We have carried out several experiments for evaluating
and comparing PASE and PATE [20] approaches in terms of
the membership privacy attack [27] designed to determine
whether a given data record was a member of the model’s
training dataset. In our experiments, we used three datasets:
CIFAR-10 dataset [12] contains 50,000 training images and
10,000 test images.
MNIST dataset [14] contains 60,000 training images and
10,000 test images.
SVHN dataset [19] contains 600,000 images.
We re-partitioned these standard datasets in the follow-
ing way: (1) merged the training and test sets; (2) split the
whole dataset into two disjoint parts, where the first part is
for the baseline model, PASE model and PATE model, and
the second part is for the membership attack model; (3) the
dataset for each model is further split to training and test
sets (for the training data of PATE model, we used 90% for
the teacher model’s training and the remaining 10% – for
the student model’s training).
We have used different classification models for different
datasets to show the effects of the privacy preservation mod-
els. For each dataset, we have used the same classification
model for the baseline (undefended) model, PASE model,
PATE model and the shadow models of the membership in-
ference. For MNIST, we used a 3-layer fully connected
neural network (DNN - Dense layer Neural Network). For
SVHN, we used a CNN model from the released PATE code
which consists of 2 convolutional layers and some fully con-
nected layers, pooling layers and normalization layers. For
CIFAR-10, we used a VGG16 neural network architecture.
Finally, for the attack model, we used a 3-layer fully con-
nected neural network (DNN) similar to the one used for the
MNIST dataset described above.
As [27] demonstrated, even small overfitting can be ef-
ficiently leveraged by an attacker towards making statisti-
cally meaningful membership inference. Since generaliza-
tion performance of different machine learning algorithms
vary, in order to demonstrate both the efficiency of mem-
bership inference attack on the unprotected machine learn-
ing model and the efficiency of corresponding membership
privacy protection mechanisms, we need to choose a ma-
chine learning model that exhibits some overfitting while
having good utility accuracy. For example, on the model
architecture selection for the MNIST dataset, we used the
DNN model because the DNN model has good utility ac-
curacy and noticeable overfitting. In one experiment of un-
defended baseline model training on MNIST dataset with
DNN model, the test accuracy was 97.06% and the train-
ing accuracy was 100%. The generalization error, i.e., the
difference between training and testing accuracy, was thus
2.94% which indicates noticeable overfitting. We also tried
the CNN model on MNIST dataset. The testing accuracy
was very good (which was 99%) but the overfitting was
small (the generalization error was 1%). Therefore, we did
not use the CNN model for MNIST dataset to explore the
effects of the privacy preservation models: there would not
be much privacy leakage there, and thus there would not be
much need for prevention of such privacy leakage.
Similarly, the generalization error of the baseline model
with the VGG16 architecture on CIFAR-10 dataset was
25.9% and the generalization error of the baseline model
with the CNN architecture on SVHN dataset was 3.4%.
Note that the generalization errors were higher than typi-
cal models trained with full datasets. We did not use the
full datasets for the training and testing of baseline mod-
els as well as of PASE and PATE models because we put
aside part of the data for training the membership attack’s
shadow models. Overfitting and generalization error usu-
ally increase with the decrease of the size of training data.
During the inference phase, one of our k auxiliary PASE
classifiers is selected to answer a test query. We assume
that the samples in the PASE training data are unique. If the
querying sample is in the training data, there will be only
one classifier which is not trained with that querying sam-
ple and that classifier is chosen to answer that query. If the
querying sample is not in the training data, none of the k
PASE classifiers are trained with that querying sample. In
that case, we look for a sample in the training data which
is most similar to the querying sample and choose the clas-
sifier which was not trained with that most similar sample
to answer the query. Training data are randomly partitioned
and similar training samples may end up in random differ-
ent partitions. If there are samples in the training data that
are not unique, we can either remove the duplicate samples
or partition the training data in such a way that the same
duplicate samples land in a same partition so that PASE
switching mechanism will still work properly. In our exper-
iments, we used the FAISS library [10] to build the search
index for similarity search of test sample on training data.
The index for fast searching can be precomputed and can be
efficiently used for very large datasets. For the experimen-
tal results presented in this paper, we simply converted the
training images from their original 2D matrix format to 1D
vectors and then built the FAISS index using L2 distance
metric. Since image similarity search can also rely on var-
ious image feature descriptors / representations, we plan to
explore, in our future work, alternative ways of building the
search index by leveraging specialized feature descriptors
and representations of the images, such as SIFT [15], image
embedding using Convolutional Neural Networks [11], etc.
The results of our experiments are summarized in Ta-
ble 1 - Table 4. For comparison purposes, the PATE results
are produced without the random noise added for the PATE
model’s student. Indeed, if it is added, the privacy attack
accuracy does not change (it is already at the level of 50%),
while the utility accuracy is reduced. A large number of
teacher classifiers can then compensate the utility accuracy
loss, but, for some datasets such as CIFAR10 , a large num-
ber of teacher classifiers reduces the size of training data
for each PATE teacher, which, in turn, reduces the teacher
model’s accuracy, and, therefore, the student’s accuracy will
be also reduced. The PASE models used ensemble of k = 5
classifiers. The attack models used 10 shadow models for
training data generation. The other experiment parameters
used for the results in tables were as follows.
CIFAR-10 dataset: 29,000 samples used for utility model
training and test; the utility models used the VGG16 neural
network; the PATE model used 10 teachers.
MNIST dataset: 30,000 samples used for utility model
training and test; the utility models used the DNN neural
network; the PATE model used 20 teachers.
SVHN dataset: 80,000 samples used for utility model train-
ing and test; the utility models used the CNN neural net-
work; PATE model used 100 teachers.
Utility accuracy
Dataset Baseline PASE PATE
CIFAR10 74.13% 69.64% 26.79%
MNIST 97.06% 96.53% 88.87%
SVHN 95.46% 95.11% 79.73%
Table 1. Utility accuracy of baseline classification model, PASE
and PATE privacy-preserving models.
Attack accuracy
Dataset Baseline PASE PATE
CIFAR10 68.70% 50.17% 50.20%
MNIST 53.48% 50.15% 51.00%
SVHN 52.15% 49.87% 50.22%
Table 2. Membership inference attack accuracy of baseline classi-
fication model, PASE and PATE privacy-preserving models.
As Table 2 shows, both PATE and PASE approaches
achieve their goal of eliminating privacy leakage (the suc-
cess rate of membership inference attack is practically equal
to the value 50% of the random choice), with PASE ap-
proach maintaining the accuracy of the defended model
quite closely to the original baseline model as shown in
Table 1. Note that it was achieved by using only k = 5
classifiers in PASE ensemble: a proportionally longer train-
ing time of a larger number of k classifiers would provide
classification performance that is even closer to the baseline
model, while retaining the same level of privacy protection.
Training time
( the ratio over baseline training time)
Dataset Baseline PASE PATE
CIFAR10 1 3.3 1.2 (10 teachers)
MNIST 1 3.2 1.4 (20 teachers)
SVHN 1 3.1 23.2 (100 teachers)
Table 3. Training time of baseline classification model, PASE and
PATE privacy-preserving models.
Table 3 shows the computing time used to train the mod-
els. The results are the ratios of the models’ training time
over their corresponding baseline models’ training time. We
used k = 5 in our experiments, and the total time to train
the five PASE models is about 3.2 times larger than the time
used to train one baseline model. Note that the training time
of PATE models varies significantly since different numbers
of teachers were used.
Inference time
( millisecond per sample)
Dataset Architecture Baseline PASE PATE
CIFAR10 VGG16 0.35 0.94 0.30
MNIST DNN 0.034 0.120 0.028
SVHN CNN 0.107 0.416 0.106
Table 4. Inference time of baseline classification model, PASE and
PATE privacy-preserving models.
Table 4 shows the inference time of the trained models
on their corresponding test samples. PASE model’s infer-
ence time is expectedly longer (but still well within practi-
cal bounds) to that of the baseline model. This is mostly due
to the time used to search for the most similar training sam-
ple in the FAISS index. The PATE model’s inference time
is comparable to that of the baseline model. The VGG16
model, which was used for CIFAR10 dataset, is more com-
plex than the CNN model which was used for the SVHN
dataset; the CNN model is more complex than the DNN
model, which was used for the MNIST dataset. As a result,
the inference times of the CIFAR10 models were longer
than those of the SVHN models, and the inference times of
SVHN models were longer than those of the MNIST mod-
els.
4. Conclusions
We have proposed and tested a novel approach of pre-
venting privacy leakage of machine learning models dur-
ing membership inference attacks. We showed that our ap-
proach has good performance (both in terms of privacy leak-
age avoidance and small accuracy penalty) on several cali-
bration image datasets.
In future work, we plan to explore various implemen-
tation options (such as selection of number and type of
constituent auxiliary classifiers in the switching ensem-
ble, choices in inference mechanism, etc.), build similar-
ity search index with state of the art feature descriptors
and explore the applicability of our approach to non-image
datasets. We also plan to investigate the feasibility of “next
level” model inversion attacks against PASE architecture (as
described in the end of Section 2) and the corresponding
modifications of PASE architecture that they might necessi-
tate.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for the support of NGA via contract
number NM0476-19-C-0007. The views, opinions and/or
findings expressed are those of the authors and should not
be interpreted as representing the official views or policies
of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. This
paper has been approved for public release, NGA # 19-977.
References
[1] G. Ateniese, G. Felici, L. V. Mancini, A. Spognardi, A. Vil-
lani, and D. Vitali. Hacking smart machines with smarter
ones: How to extract meaningful data from machine learn-
ing classifiers. CoRR, abs/1306.4447, 2013. 1
[2] S. Basu, R. Izmailov, and C. Mesterharm. Member-
ship model inversion attacks for deep networks. ArXiv,
abs/1910.04257, 2019. 1, 4
[3] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´,
P. Laskov, G. Giacinto, and F. Roli. Evasion attacks against
machine learning at test time. In H. Blockeel, K. Kersting,
S. Nijssen, and F. Zˇelezny´, editors, Machine Learning and
Knowledge Discovery in Databases, pages 387–402, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2013. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 1
[4] B. Biggio, G. Fumera, and F. Roli. Security evaluation of pat-
tern classifiers under attack. IEEE Transactions on Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering, 99:1, 01 2013. 1
[5] Q. Chen, C. Xiang, M. Xue, B. Li, N. Borisov, D. Kaafar,
and H. Zhu. Differentially private data generative models.
CoRR, abs/1812.02274, 2018. 1
[6] C. Dwork and A. Roth. The algorithmic foundations of dif-
ferential privacy. Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., 9(3–
4):211–407, Aug. 2014. 1, 2
[7] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart. Model inversion at-
tacks that exploit confidence information and basic counter-
measures. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’15,
pages 1322–1333, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM. 1
[8] M. Fredrikson, E. Lantz, S. Jha, S. Lin, D. Page, and T. Ris-
tenpart. Privacy in pharmacogenetics: An end-to-end case
study of personalized warfarin dosing. In 23rd USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security 14), pages 17–32, San
Diego, CA, Aug. 2014. USENIX Association. 1
[9] J. Hayes, L. Melis, G. Danezis, and E. D. Cristofaro. LO-
GAN: evaluating privacy leakage of generative models us-
ing generative adversarial networks. CoRR, abs/1705.07663,
2017. 1
[10] J. Johnson, M. Douze, and H. Je´gou. Billion-scale similarity
search with gpus. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08734, 2017. 2,
5
[11] D. Kiela and L. Bottou. Learning and transferring mid-level
image representations using convolutional neural networks.
In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Empirical Meth-
ods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP), pages 36–
45, 25–29 October 2014. 5
[12] A. Krizhevsky, V. Nair, and G. Hinton. Cifar-10 (canadian
institute for advanced research). 2, 3, 4
[13] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial ex-
amples in the physical world. 07 2016. 1
[14] Y. LeCun and C. Cortes. MNIST handwritten digit database.
2010. 2, 3, 4
[15] D. G. Lowe. Distinctive image features from scale-invariant
keypoints. In International Journal of Computer Vision, vol-
ume 60, pages 91–110, 25–29 October 2004. 5
[16] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural net-
works. CVPR, 11 2016. 1
[17] M. Nasr, R. Shokri, and A. Houmansadr. Machine learning
with membership privacy using adversarial regularization. In
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security, CCS ’18, pages 634–
646, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. 1
[18] B. Nelson, B. Rubinstein, L. Huang, A. D. Joseph, S. J. Lee,
S. Rao, and J. D. Tygar. Query strategies for evading convex-
inducing classifiers. Journal of Machine Learning Research,
13, 07 2010. 1
[19] Y. Netzer, T. Wang, A. Coates, A. Bissacco, B. Wu, and A. Y.
Ng. Reading digits in natural images with unsupervised fea-
ture learning. In NIPS Workshop on Deep Learning and Un-
supervised Feature Learning 2011, 2011. 2, 4
[20] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, U´. Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow, and
K. Talwar. Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep
learning from private training data. In Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference on Learning Representations, 2017.
1, 2, 4
[21] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks
using adversarial samples. 05 2016. 1
[22] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. pages 506–519, 04 2017. 1
[23] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversar-
ial settings. pages 372–387, 03 2016. 1
[24] A. Salem, Y. Zhang, M. Humbert, M. Fritz, and M. Backes.
Ml-leaks: Model and data independent membership in-
ference attacks and defenses on machine learning models.
CoRR, abs/1806.01246, 2018. 1
[25] M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, and M. Reiter. Acces-
sorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art
face recognition. pages 1528–1540, 10 2016. 1
[26] R. Shokri, M. Strobel, and Y. Zick. Privacy risks of explain-
ing machine learning models. CoRR, abs/1907.00164, 2019.
1
[27] R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, and V. Shmatikov. Mem-
bership inference attacks against machine learning models.
In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2017,
San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2017, pages 3–18, 2017. 1,
2, 3, 4
[28] F. Trame`r, F. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Risten-
part. Stealing machine learning models via prediction apis.
In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16),
pages 601–618, Austin, TX, Aug. 2016. USENIX Associa-
tion. 1
[29] X. Wu, M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and J. F. Naughton. A
methodology for formalizing model-inversion attacks. In
CSF, pages 355–370. IEEE Computer Society, 2016. 1
